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DRAFT 10/24/11 
THE EFFECTIVE TAX RATES OF THE LARGEST US AND 
EU MULTINATIONALS 
Reuven Avi-Yonah1 and Yaron Lahav2 
1. Introduction 
The United States has the second highest statutory corporate tax rate in the OECD (after 
Japan). This has not always been the case: After the 1986 tax reform act lowered the US 
rate from 46% to 34%, the US had one of the lowest statutory corporate tax rates in the 
OECD. However, in the past 25 years, the US rate has remained essentially unchanged (it 
was raised to 35% in 1993), while most other OECD countries reduced their statutory rate 
so that the OECD average statutory corporate tax rate is 25.5%.3  
 
Not surprisingly, this situation has led to numerous calls for lowering the US statutory 
corporate tax rate, on the grounds that it is making US-based multinationals uncompetitive 
vis-a-vis their counterparts in other OECD countries. Recently, even the Obama 
Administration, following the lead of some Democrats in Congress, has supported 
lowering the corporate tax rate.4 The current debate is less about whether the corporate 
rate should be lowered and more about whether such a reform should be revenue neutral, 
i.e., paid for by eliminating corporate tax expenditures such as deferral, accelerated 
depreciation, and the tax credit for domestic production. 
 
At the same time, however, there have been a plethora of conflicting claims about the 
effective tax rate borne by US-based multinationals. Some have stated that like the 
statutory rate, it is among the highest in the OECD, while others have claimed that it is 
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and not the statutory rate that most directly affects the competitiveness of US-based 
multinationals against multinationals based in other OECD jurisdictions. 
 
However, neither side has data to support its claims. Almost all existing studies of the 
effective tax rate on US-based multinationals focus only on those companies, and do not 
attempt to compare them with multinationals based in other countries.6 The only exception 
is a recent study commissioned by the Business Roundtable and executed by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.7 However, as discussed below, this study suffers from numerous 
flaws, the most important of which is that it includes 2000 companies from 58 foreign 
countries and therefore has many companies that are not serious competitors of large US-
based multinationals (e.g., companies based in Morocco, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Oman).   
 
The competitiveness issue is primarily about the ability of the largest US multinationals to 
compete with their counterparts based in other countries, and especially those based in the 
EU (since Japanese multinationals are known to be subject to higher statutory and 
effective tax rates than US ones, and therefore they are less relevant to this debate).8 We 
have therefore decided to study the overall effective tax rates of the largest 100 US-based 
multinationals over the past decade, and compare them with the effective tax rates of the 
largest 100 EU-based multinationals.9 In our opinion, this is the comparison that is most 
relevant to resolving the competitiveness issue, because (a) it focuses only on large 
multinationals in the most relevant jurisdictions10, (b) it focuses on the overall effective 
tax rate borne by each group of multinationals, and not on other issues such as the 
statutory tax rate, the effective tax rate on foreign source income, or whether dividends 
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To find the 100 biggest U.S. companies and the 100 biggest European companies, we used 
the list of Forbes 2000 biggest public companies for 2011, as published in Forbes 
magazine’s website11. We then constructed our database by choosing the most highly 
ranked U.S. and European companies respectively. The list of the 200 chosen companies is 
presented in Table 1.   
We then searched the COMPUSTAT database (both North America and Global) to find 
financial data of the chosen companies. For every company in our list of chosen 
companies, we found the pretax income, net income and current income tax for the fiscal 
years 2001 – 2010.  
 If, for some reason, a certain company did not have any financial data available on the 
COMPUSTAT database for all fiscal years mentioned, we did not include it in our database 
and replaced it by the next highest ranked company on the Forbes 2000 list. We then 
translated all financial data into U.S. dollars using annual exchange rates taken from 
OANDA website12. At the end of this process, we obtained a database of 200 companies 
(100 U.S. companies and 100 European companies) with at least one year of financial data 
between 2001 and 2010. Table 2 describes the distribution of companies by country of 
residence. 
Comparing the effective tax rates in each region (Europe and the U.S.), we calculated 





where ,  is the aggregate effective tax rate of region i during period t. The numerator 
is the sum of all current income taxes paid by the companies residing in region i (indexed j) 
during period t and the denominator is the sum of all pretax income paid by the companies 
residing in region i during the same period. Naturally, the COMPUSTAT database may not 
have the relevant data to calculate this measure for all companies during all fiscal years. 
For this reason, we only used available data that can be found either directly (i.e. both 
pretax income and current income tax are available) or indirectly (i.e. either pretax income 
or current income tax can be found by adding current and deferred income tax to net 
income or subtracting deferred income tax and net income from pretax income 
respectively).  
                                                            
11 See www.forbes.com/global2000.  
12 See www.oanda.com/currency/converter.  
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The AETR is therefore a measure of effective tax rate paid by the business sector in every 
region. Our decision to use aggregate measures in our study is a result of (what we see as) a 
bias that can occur when using some kind of average (either weighted or not) of effective 
tax rates of individual companies. This bias is more significant when companies have a 
relatively low (or even negative) pretax income. When this is the case, all deviation from 
the current (say, 35% in the case of U.S. companies) tax provision may strongly affect the 
effective tax rate. To illustrate this, consider the following example with two companies, A 
and B. Both companies’ revenues in a given year equal $1,000,000. The pretax profits, 
however, are different and equal $100,000 and $10,000 respectively. If both pay 35% of 
pretax income as income tax, then the AETR is 35%. Assume now that there is a tax credit 
to company A on the amount of $2,000. This adjustment will decrease the effective tax rate 
of company A by approximately 6% (from 35% to 33%). However, if the same adjustment 
was made to company B, the effective tax rate would decrease by approximately 57% 
(from 35% to 15%). This difference would also affect the average effective tax rate if 
weighted by revenues. If the tax adjustment was made to company A, the new average 
effective tax rate would be 34%. If, on the other hand, the adjustment was made to 
company B, the new average effective tax rate would be 25%. A similar example can show 
biased calculations when the average effective tax rate is weighted by any variables other 
than pretax profit.  
Several ways are used in the literature to avoid this bias. One way (used in the PwC study 
mentioned above) is to eliminate outliers. It is reasonable to assume that relatively low (or 
negative) pretax income generates either too high or too low (or negative) effective tax 
rates. For this reason, in cases where either too high or too low effective tax rate is 
detected, the observation is eliminated. However, it is our view that outliers in this context 
are part of the data. Furthermore, when the aggregate effective tax rate is calculated the 
way we do, relatively low pretax income and relatively low income tax will have relatively 
low effect on the measure. A tax credit to a company with low or negative pretax income is 
not an outlier. It should therefore be treated the way it is: part of the total income tax 
collected by the tax authority during the tested period. 
In other cases, it is possible that such elimination will result with keeping the outliers. To 
illustrate this, consider the above example and assume that the researcher chooses to 
exclude companies with non-positive effective tax rates. Assume now that company A 
received a tax credit of $20,000 and company received a tax credit of $3,500. The 
researcher will exclude company B because of a relatively small tax adjustment, where 
company B will still be part of the data with a much larger tax adjustment. To sum, 
excluding outliers does not ensure the isolation of companies with reasonable effective tax 
rate on one hand, and does not provide accurate results on the other hand. 
Another way is to aggregate data across periods. If a certain company showed an abnormal 
tax rate in a certain year, then aggregating income taxes over several years should dismiss 
small or insignificant deviations from standard tax rate levels. For this reason, in addition 
to annual analysis, we also provide results across ten years of study. 
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AETR values of each region are presented in Table 3 for different fiscal years and for the 
last decade. The table shows that in eight out of ten years, the European AETR is higher 
than the U.S. AETR. In addition, the European AETR is also higher for the period 2001 – 
2010.  
As can be seen in table 3, results for the fiscal year 2008 show abnormally high AETRs. 
We believe that it is somehow connected to the economic downturn that stroke at the 
beginning of that year. For this reason, and in order to maintain the comparability of the 
results, we excluded this year from the calculated AETR for the decade and present in the 
second row from the bottom the AETR for the fiscal years 2001 – 2007, 2009 and 2010. 
Lastly, in case abnormality persisted to later year, we present in the bottom row aggregated 
results for the fiscal years 2001 – 2007 only. Overall, these adjustments resulted in minor 
modifications to the initial results presented for the decade (third row from the bottom). We 
can therefore conclude that according to the analysis, US companies pay, on average, 
effective tax rate of approximately 30%, and European companies pay, on average, 
effective tax rate of approximately 34%.  
Figure 1 describes the distribution of companies from each region by industry. The figure 
shows that the distribution is relatively similar across regions. We can also learn from the 
figure that in both regions, about half the companies are defined as manufacturers. Table 4 
shows the AETRs of each region for the years 2001 – 2011 for each industry segment 
separately. According to the table, The US AETRs are lower in the manufacturing, 
transportation, services and public administration segment, while the European AETRs are 
lower in the mining, trade and finance segments.  
4. Discussion 
Our results are the opposite from those found in the PwC study, even though the PwC 
study used the same methodology (i.e. calculated AETR as aggregate income tax divided 
by aggregate pretax income). However, in our opinion the PwC study is flawed, and should 
not be taken as an indication that US based multinationals are subject to a higher AETR 
than their counterparts from other countries. The reasons for this conclusion are as follows: 
1. PwC used all 2000 companies in the Forbes Global database, while we used only the 
largest 200 (100 U.S. and 100 EU). As explained above, in our opinion focusing on the 
largest companies is more closely related to competitiveness. 
2. PwC calculated results only for the years 2006-2009, while we calculated between 2001 
and 2010. Including a longer time frame improves the reliability of our results. 
 
3. PwC compared U.S. companies to those from 58 other countries, not to European 
companies as a group (although they did compare U.S. to OECD countries). We used the 
5
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biggest 100 U.S and biggest 100 European companies. In our opinion this method is more 
relevant to the competitiveness question because the PwC includes many companies from 
small countries that do not provide serious competition to large US multinationals (e.g., 
Morocco). 
 
4. PwC eliminated outliers, while we did not. As explained above, outliers can have an 
important impact on the results and there is no reason to assume they are irrelevant in this 
context. By eliminating outliers, PwC limited themselves to conventional cases only (i.e. 
only to those companies with effective tax rate in the 20%-40% range). In our opinion, this 
analysis is all about the outliers. We are looking for the special cases that make the 
difference. This is why we only include the top 100 companies from each group. In such a 
small number, any tax holiday should make the difference, so it is important to include 
outliers. 
 
5. For income tax, PwC used current income tax and changes in deferred tax, while we 
used only current income tax. While over a ten year period one might expect that most 
deferred taxes will become current taxes, in our opinion using deferred taxes can be 
misleading because they just represent one accounting firm’s best guess as to whether taxes 
will have to be paid. For example, under FIN 48 deferred taxes have to be booked if a 
transaction that avoids taxation has a 50% chance of being upheld by the courts if 
challenged by the IRS, but not if it has a 51% chance (in the opinion of the accounting 
firm). In addition, deferred taxes may or may not include the tax on repatriations, 
depending on the company’s assertion that the earnings are or are not permanently 
reinvested overseas, which in turn assumes that the tax law relating to repatriations will 
remain unchanged. In our opinion these determinations are too flimsy a basis to calculate 
AETRs reliably. Using only current taxes insures that the AETR reflects taxes that have 
actually been paid or accrued. 
  
6. Table 1 of the PwC study provides a list of 59 countries that were included in the 
analysis. But from tables A1 to A4 of the appendix to the PwC study, only 13 countries 
have more than 30 observations in each year. This means that for all the rest, it cannot be 
assumed (statistically) that the results properly represent the real populations. Among these 
13, the U.S. ranked number 7 (right in the middle). In addition, the AETRs of some 
countries from the 59 are based on one observation, which cannot be representative. 
 
In contrast with the PwC study, our results are consistent with previous studies that have 
focused on comparing the ETRs of various jurisdictions.13 For example, Markle and 
Shackleford compared the US effective corporate tax rate in 2005-2009 with the ETRs of 
Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the UK and found that the US ETR was 23% while 
the average weighted ETR of the other six countries was 24.5%.14 Swenson and Lee 
compared ETRs in 2006 and found that the US ETR was 29.5% while the OECD weighted 
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the weighted average ETR in 2006 was 28.7% (compared to the US 29.5%).16 A PwC 
study from 2008 concluded that the US ETR was 27.1% while the weighted average for the 
OECD excluding the US was 27.7%; for the fifteen largest countries outside the US, the 
weighted average ETR was 27.2%.17 As Gravelle concluded, these studies all confirm that 




We believe that this study indicates that US-based multinationals do not face a tax induced 
competitive disadvantage in competing against EU-based multinationals. Even though the 
US statutory rate is ten percentage points higher than the average corporate statutory rate 
in the EU, the effective US corporate tax rate is the same or lower than the effective EU 
corporate tax rate for the largest US and EU multinationals. 
 
Presumably, the reason for this result is that while the EU countries have a lower statutory 
rate, their tax base is larger because it has fewer exceptions. In fact, a comparison of the 
CFC rules of the US (Subpart F) and the major EU jurisdictions (UK, Germany, Italy, 
France) indicates that the EU CFC rules tend to be tougher than Subpart F because (a) 
they take into account the effective tax rate in the source country in deciding whether to 
tax income from a CFC, and (b) they take into account whether the CFC has a real 
presence in the source country. Under the EU rules, for example, a bank earning interest 
income in a tax haven is likely to be subject to current tax because the effective tax rate in 
the haven is low and the bank does not have a real presence in the haven. Under Subpart F 
the income will likely qualify for the active financing exception. In addition, the EU does 
not have anything like the US rules that enable US multinationals to shift profits from high 
tax to low tax CFCs without incurring a US tax cost (check the box and IRC 954(c)(6)).  
 
This conclusion suggests that the US can in fact reduce its corporate tax rate to the EU 
average in a revenue neutral fashion without affecting the competitiveness of US-based 
multinationals, since such a move would simply result in a tax regime that is more similar 
to that faced by EU companies.  Specifically, as many observers have recommended, it 
should be possible to abolish deferral altogether if the US rate were reduced sufficiently. 
Such a move would have tremendous simplification potential since it would be possible to 
get rid of both Subpart F and outbound transfer pricing enforcement, and it would 
eliminate the “lock out” problem as well (since repatriations would not be taxed). 
Alternatively, it should be possible to amend Subpart F to take the source country rate into 
account, so that an effective source rate that is below 90% of the US statutory rate would 
result in a Subpart F inclusion, while reducing the US statutory rate. Such a move, while 
not as radically simplifying as abolishing deferral, will significantly reduce the pressure on 
outbound transfer pricing while not resulting in a competitive disadvantage to US-based 
multinationals or inducing more profit shifting from the US to low taxed offshore 
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Table 1: The 200 chosen companies. The companies are ordered by their rank, sales, profits, assets and market value are  
as published by the Forbes 2000 website. 
Rank Company Country Sales Profits Assets Market Value 
1 JPMorgan Chase United States $115.5 B $17.4 B $2,117.6 B $182.2 B 
2 HSBC Holdings United Kingdom $103.3 B $13.3 B $2,467.9 B $186.5 B 
3 General Electric United States $150.2 B $11.6 B $751.2 B $216.2 B 
4 ExxonMobil United States $341.6 B $30.5 B $302.5 B $407.2 B 
5 Royal Dutch Shell Netherlands $369.1 B $20.1 B $317.2 B $212.9 B 
8 Berkshire Hathaway United States $136.2 B $13 B $372.2 B $211 B 
10 Citigroup United States $111.5 B $10.6 B $1,913.9 B $132.8 B 
11 Wells Fargo United States $93.2 B $12.4 B $1,258.1 B $170.6 B 
11 BNP Paribas France $130.4 B $10.5 B $2,680.7 B $88 B 
13 Banco Santander Spain $109.7 B $12.8 B $1,570.6 B $94.7 B 
14 AT&T United States $124.3 B $19.9 B $268.5 B $168.2 B 
16 Chevron United States $189.6 B $19 B $184.8 B $200.6 B 
18 Wal-Mart Stores United States $421.8 B $16.4 B $180.7 B $187.3 B 
19 Total France $188.1 B $14.2 B $192.8 B $138 B 
20 Allianz Germany $142.9 B $6.7 B $838.4 B $62.7 B 
22 ConocoPhillips United States $175.8 B $11.4 B $156.3 B $109.1 B 
24 Volkswagen Group Germany $168.3 B $9.1 B $267.5 B $70.3 B 
26 Nestlé Switzerland $112 B $36.7 B $117.7 B $181.1 B 
27 Vodafone United Kingdom $67.5 B $13.1 B $236.6 B $148.2 B 
28 ENI Italy $130.5 B $8.4 B $176.1 B $96.8 B 
29 American Intl Group United States $77.3 B $7.8 B $683.4 B $67.1 B 
29 GDF Suez France $113.1 B $6.2 B $245.5 B $85.2 B 
31 IBM United States $99.9 B $14.8 B $113.4 B $198.1 B 
31 Telefónica Spain $81.3 B $13.6 B $166.5 B $113.3 B 
35 Procter & Gamble United States $79.6 B $11.2 B $134.3 B $172.2 B 
36 Pfizer United States $67.8 B $8.3 B $195 B $155.7 B 
37 Goldman Sachs Group United States $46 B $8.4 B $911.3 B $90 B 
38 E.ON Germany $124.6 B $7.9 B $205.1 B $64 B 
39 ING Group Netherlands $149.2 B $4.3 B $1,665.3 B $46.8 B 
40 UBS Switzerland $49.8 B $7.7 B $1,403 B $70.8 B 
41 Barclays United Kingdom $63.9 B $5.6 B $2,328.3 B $58.3 B 
42 Hewlett-Packard United States $127.2 B $9.1 B $119.9 B $90.3 B 
43 Daimler Germany $130.9 B $6 B $178.7 B $70.5 B 
44 Société Générale France $85.4 B $5.3 B $1,518.7 B $46.9 B 
45 Siemens Germany $103.5 B $5.3 B $135 B $110.2 B 
47 Apple United States $76.3 B $16.6 B $86.7 B $324.3 B 
48 AXA Group France $162.4 B $3.7 B $981.8 B $46.4 B 
50 Microsoft United States $66.7 B $20.6 B $92.3 B $215.8 B 
54 Ford Motor United States $129 B $6.6 B $164.7 B $54.3 B 
55 ENEL Italy $96.5 B $5.9 B $217.4 B $54 B 
57 Johnson & Johnson United States $61.6 B $13.3 B $102.9 B $163.3 B 
58 Rio Tinto United Kingdom $56.6 B $14.3 B $112.4 B $131.6 B 
59 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland $53.9 B $5.2 B $1,097.1 B $50.7 B 
60 Statoil Norway $90.4 B $6.5 B $110.3 B $83.8 B 
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Rank Company Country Sales Profits Assets Market Value 
62 Deutsche Bank Germany $61.2 B $3.1 B $2,556.5 B $59.6 B 
62 Novartis Switzerland $50.6 B $9.8 B $123.3 B $125.2 B 
64 Verizon Communications United States $106.6 B $2.5 B $220 B $101.3 B 
66 BBVA-Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain $43.4 B $6.3 B $734.1 B $52.3 B 
72 BMW Group Germany $80.2 B $4.3 B $146.1 B $51 B 
73 BASF Germany $85.5 B $6.1 B $78.2 B $74.2 B 
74 France Telecom France $60.9 B $6.5 B $120.5 B $56.7 B 
81 Morgan Stanley United States $38 B $4.7 B $807.7 B $43.8 B 
81 Sanofi-aventis France $40.7 B $7.3 B $110.3 B $89.2 B 
83 MetLife United States $52.7 B $2.8 B $730.9 B $48.4 B 
86 PepsiCo United States $57.8 B $6.3 B $68.2 B $102.6 B 
87 Cisco Systems United States $42.4 B $7.6 B $82 B $99.2 B 
89 Roche Holding Switzerland $50.8 B $9.3 B $62.9 B $120.9 B 
90 ArcelorMittal Luxembourg $78 B $2.9 B $130.9 B $53.6 B 
91 Coca-Cola United States $35.1 B $11.8 B $72.9 B $148.7 B 
92 Deutsche Telekom Germany $83.6 B $2.3 B $164.6 B $60.7 B 
93 Intel United States $43.6 B $11.5 B $63.2 B $114.5 B 
96 Anheuser-Busch Belgium $36.8 B $4.1 B $113.8 B $90.6 B 
100 EDF Group France $87.2 B $1.4 B $319.9 B $78.2 B 
101 Repsol YPF Spain $62.2 B $6.2 B $90.4 B $39.6 B 
101 RWE Group Germany $67.9 B $4.4 B $121.7 B $35.4 B 
103 Unilever Netherlands $59.3 B $5.7 B $54.8 B $91.9 B 
104 Comcast United States $37.9 B $3.6 B $118.5 B $68.7 B 
105 Kraft Foods United States $49.2 B $4.1 B $95.3 B $55.4 B 
106 UnitedHealth Group United States $94.2 B $4.6 B $63.1 B $47.7 B 
107 Oracle United States $32 B $6.8 B $67.2 B $161.2 B 
108 Tesco United Kingdom $79.6 B $3.5 B $70.1 B $50.5 B 
110 Walt Disney United States $39 B $4.4 B $71 B $81.5 B 
112 United Technologies United States $54.3 B $4.4 B $58.5 B $74.8 B 
113 Iberdrola Spain $40.7 B $3.8 B $121 B $45 B 
114 American Express United States $30.2 B $4.1 B $147 B $53.2 B 
116 Prudential Financial United States $38.4 B $3.2 B $539.9 B $30.7 B 
117 Prudential United Kingdom $75.6 B $2.2 B $408.3 B $29.4 B 
118 Boeing United States $64.3 B $3.3 B $68.6 B $52.7 B 
119 CVS Caremark United States $96.4 B $3.4 B $62.2 B $46.5 B 
120 Google United States $29.3 B $8.5 B $57.9 B $185.8 B 
125 Møller-Maersk Denmark $56.6 B $4.7 B $66.5 B $40.5 B 
127 Abbott Laboratories United States $35.2 B $4.6 B $59.5 B $75 B 
129 AstraZeneca United Kingdom $33.6 B $8.1 B $54.8 B $65.6 B 
131 US Bancorp United States $20.5 B $3.3 B $307.8 B $52.2 B 
133 Anglo American United Kingdom $28.4 B $6.6 B $66.4 B $66.2 B 
134 GlaxoSmithKline United Kingdom $44.3 B $2.5 B $62.1 B $99.2 B 
135 Aviva United Kingdom $90.7 B $2.3 B $567.9 B $20.5 B 
138 Caterpillar United States $42.6 B $2.7 B $64 B $63.9 B 
140 Dow Chemical United States $53.7 B $2.3 B $69.6 B $43 B 
9
Avi-Yonah and Lahav:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2011
Rank Company Country Sales Profits Assets Market Value 
142 Home Depot United States $68 B $3.3 B $40.1 B $60.9 B 
146 Vivendi France $38.7 B $2.9 B $76.7 B $33.8 B 
147 Bayer Group Germany $47 B $1.7 B $67.5 B $62.5 B 
149 News Corp United States $33.1 B $3.1 B $56.7 B $45.5 B 
150 Vinci France $45.5 B $2.4 B $75.5 B $32.9 B 
151 Marathon Oil United States $67.1 B $2.6 B $50 B $35.6 B 
152 PNC Financial Services United States $17.1 B $3.4 B $264.3 B $33.1 B 
153 Philip Morris International United States $27.2 B $7.3 B $35 B $114.6 B 
154 United Parcel Service United States $49.5 B $3.5 B $33.6 B $73.1 B 
155 Target United States $67.4 B $2.9 B $43.7 B $35.7 B 
158 Occidental Petroleum United States $19.2 B $4.5 B $52.4 B $80.3 B 
159 British Amer Tobacco United Kingdom $23.2 B $4.5 B $43 B $76.6 B 
161 Nokia Finland $56.8 B $2.5 B $50.3 B $31.2 B 
162 Renault France $52.2 B $4.6 B $93.1 B $16.7 B 
163 Time Warner United States $26.9 B $2.6 B $66.5 B $39.7 B 
166 Travelers Cos United States $25.1 B $3.2 B $105.2 B $25.4 B 
167 WellPoint United States $58.8 B $2.9 B $50.2 B $25.5 B 
168 Deutsche Post Germany $68.3 B $3.4 B $50.5 B $21.7 B 
170 Merck & Co United States $46 B $861 M $105.8 B $100.9 B 
173 EI du Pont de Nemours United States $32.7 B $3 B $40.4 B $48.8 B 
174 BG Group United Kingdom $17.4 B $3.4 B $50 B $79.2 B 
176 Bank of New York Mellon United States $14.5 B $2.5 B $247.3 B $36 B 
181 McDonald's United States $24.1 B $4.9 B $32 B $80.1 B 
182 Dell United States $61.5 B $2.6 B $38.6 B $29.5 B 
183 Aegon Netherlands $42.4 B $2.4 B $445.8 B $14.2 B 
184 Capital One Financial United States $19.1 B $2.7 B $197.5 B $22.7 B 
188 Aflac United States $20.7 B $2.3 B $101 B $26.1 B 
190 3M United States $26.7 B $4.1 B $30.2 B $65.2 B 
192 Lockheed Martin United States $45.8 B $2.9 B $35.1 B $28.2 B 
193 L'Oréal Group France $26.1 B $3 B $31.4 B $67.9 B 
194 Honeywell International United States $33.4 B $2 B $37.8 B $44.1 B 
195 Volvo Group Sweden $39.4 B $1.6 B $45.5 B $34.8 B 
196 Schneider Electric France $26.2 B $2.3 B $40.3 B $43.3 B 
196 National Grid United Kingdom $20.7 B $2.1 B $66.1 B $32 B 
198 Archer Daniels United States $68.6 B $1.9 B $42.6 B $23 B 
199 Lowe's Cos United States $48.8 B $2 B $33.7 B $36.5 B 
200 Deere & Co United States $27.3 B $2.1 B $42.9 B $37 B 
201 Amgen United States $15.1 B $4.6 B $43.5 B $49.9 B 
204 Imperial Tobacco Group United Kingdom $23.6 B $2.4 B $48 B $32.2 B 
206 Walgreen United States $68.4 B $2.2 B $27 B $38.7 B 
207 Eli Lilly & Co United States $23.1 B $5.1 B $31 B $40.4 B 
208 Altria Group United States $16.9 B $3.9 B $37.4 B $52.4 B 
210 Philips Netherlands $34 B $1.9 B $41.5 B $30.4 B 
211 Union Pacific United States $17 B $2.8 B $43.1 B $46.5 B 
215 Ericsson Sweden $30.3 B $1.7 B $40 B $40 B 
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216 Exelon United States $18.6 B $2.6 B $52.2 B $28.6 B 
216 Christian Dior France $28.3 B $1.7 B $55.3 B $25.7 B 
218 Danone France $22.8 B $2.5 B $35.9 B $39.7 B 
222 Freeport Copper United States $19 B $4.3 B $29.4 B $46.8 B 
222 ACE Switzerland $16 B $3.1 B $83.4 B $20.6 B 
224 General Dynamics United States $32.5 B $2.6 B $32.5 B $28.4 B 
225 Southern Co United States $17.5 B $2 B $55 B $32.4 B 
225 Metro AG Germany $90.2 B $1.1 B $47 B $23 B 
227 Centrica United Kingdom $35 B $3 B $29.8 B $27.4 B 
229 Hess United States $33.9 B $2.1 B $35.4 B $27.1 B 
231 Bristol-Myers Squibb United States $19.5 B $3.1 B $31.1 B $45 B 
235 ThyssenKrupp Group Germany $58.1 B $1.1 B $58.9 B $20 B 
238 TeliaSonera Sweden $15.9 B $3.2 B $35.9 B $38.2 B 
241 EADS Netherlands $60.7 B $733.6 M $111.2 B $22 B 
242 Apache United States $12.1 B $3 B $43.4 B $45.5 B 
245 Carrefour Group France $120.6 B $579.7 M $70.9 B $31.2 B 
246 Costco Wholesale United States $82 B $1.4 B $25.7 B $31.7 B 
247 Medtronic United States $15.8 B $3.3 B $30.6 B $40.7 B 
248 SAP Germany $16.7 B $2.4 B $27.8 B $71.9 B 
250 BT Group United Kingdom $31.7 B $1.6 B $40.2 B $23.4 B 
252 Qualcomm United States $11.7 B $3.6 B $31.3 B $88.1 B 
254 Dominion Resources United States $15.2 B $2.8 B $42.8 B $26.4 B 
255 EMC United States $17 B $1.9 B $30.8 B $55 B 
258 Hartford Finl Svcs United States $22.4 B $1.7 B $318.3 B $12.3 B 
260 Bouygues France $41.8 B $1.4 B $47.4 B $16.5 B 
264 Allstate United States $31.4 B $928 M $130.9 B $16.9 B 
267 NextEra Energy United States $15.3 B $2 B $53 B $23.4 B 
269 Gas Natural Group Spain $26.3 B $1.6 B $59.5 B $15.4 B 
271 Holcim Switzerland $23.2 B $1.3 B $47.1 B $23.4 B 
272 Northrop Grumman United States $34.8 B $2.1 B $31.4 B $19.3 B 
275 Air Liquide France $18.1 B $1.9 B $30.2 B $36.1 B 
276 Diageo United Kingdom $14.6 B $2.4 B $28.3 B $47.3 B 
278 Emerson Electric United States $21.7 B $2.2 B $22.7 B $44.8 B 
279 McKesson United States $109.9 B $1.1 B $30.4 B $19.8 B 
281 Johnson Controls United States $35.4 B $1.5 B $26 B $27.6 B 
282 FedEx United States $38.2 B $1.3 B $26.2 B $28.6 B 
282 BlackRock United States $8.6 B $2.1 B $178.5 B $25 B 
284 BAE Systems United Kingdom $32.9 B $1.6 B $35.8 B $17.5 B 
286 Time Warner Cable United States $18.9 B $1.3 B $45.8 B $23.6 B 
290 Duke Energy United States $14.3 B $1.3 B $59.1 B $24.5 B 
291 Telenor Norway $16.3 B $2.5 B $29.4 B $26.7 B 
292 Devon Energy United States $9.9 B $4.6 B $32.9 B $37.6 B 
298 State Street United States $9.7 B $1.6 B $160.5 B $21.8 B 
302 Amazon.com United States $34.2 B $1.2 B $18.8 B $75.8 B 
303 Aetna United States $34.2 B $1.8 B $37.7 B $14 B 
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304 Scottish & Southern United Kingdom $32.7 B $1.9 B $27.3 B $17.9 B 
305 Linde Germany $17.3 B $1.3 B $36.1 B $25.8 B 
307 Peugeot France $75 B $1.5 B $91.2 B $8.7 B 
307 Veolia Environnement France $46.6 B $777.9 M $66.7 B $15 B 
309 EnBW-Energie Baden Germany $23.4 B $1.6 B $47.2 B $14.4 B 
312 Chubb United States $13.3 B $2.2 B $50.2 B $17.4 B 
313 Loews United States $14.6 B $1.3 B $76.3 B $17.4 B 
314 Lafarge France $21.6 B $1.1 B $56.4 B $16.7 B 
319 Danske Bank Group Denmark $21.7 B $657 M $578.3 B $15.6 B 
320 Alstom France $26.6 B $1.6 B $33.8 B $15.9 B 
326 EDP-Energias de Portugal Portugal $19 B $1.4 B $53.7 B $13.9 B 
336 PPR France $19.6 B $1.3 B $32.4 B $19 B 
341 Reckitt Benckiser Group United Kingdom $13.2 B $2.4 B $20.7 B $36.2 B 
343 Koç Holding Turkey $35.9 B $1.2 B $52.5 B $10.8 B 
346 Henkel Group Germany $20.2 B $1.5 B $23 B $24.4 B 
352 CEZ Czech Republic $10.6 B $2.5 B $29 B $24.6 B 
358 Fiat Group Italy $48 B $696.1 M $96.3 B $10.9 B 
363 OMV Group Austria $31.2 B $1.2 B $35.2 B $12.5 B 
376 Ferrovial Spain $16.1 B $2.9 B $55.3 B $9.2 B 
378 Continental Germany $34.9 B $771.1 M $31.8 B $16.8 B 
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Table 2: The number of companies by country of residence. 
Row Labels Count of Company 
Austria 1 
Belgium 1 














United Kingdom 20 











Europe US Revenue Ratio 
(US/EU) 
2001 39% 33% 1.19  
2002 49% 32% 1.06  
2003 34% 24% 0.99  
2004 31% 27% 1.02  
2005 34% 30% 1.20  
2006 32% 31% 1.16  
2007 31% 32% 1.25  
2008 46% 56% 1.22  
2009 37% 30% 1.21  
2010 31% 24% 1.25  
2001 – 2010 35% 31% 1.16  
Excluding 2008 34% 29% 1.15 
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